THE MEANING OF  CONTROL  IN THE PROTECTION OF INVESTORS by unknown
THE MEANING OF 'CONTROL" IN THE
PROTECTION OF INVESTORS
THE stock market crash of 1929 exposed a catalogue of corporate prac-
tices employed to deceive and discriminate against the small investor. These
practices were largely instrumental in bringing on mass financial ruin.' For
years corporations had floated large quantities of unsound stocks without
telling investors about the true state of their assets and earning power, or
the identity of their promotors, managers, and chief stockholders. 2 Cor-
porate insiders, capitalizing on secret information about impending corpo.
rate action, had themselves extracted huge profits from ordinary investors
by selling their own stock to the public in advance of expected price de-
clines.3 Organizers of holding and investment companies, by obtaining un-
fair contracts or excessive payments from their operating subsidiaries, had
siphoned off vast sums of subsidiary profits. 4 In reorganizations, 5 security
conversions, 6 and dividend declarations,7 the interests of small investors
were often sacrificed to those of large stockholders.
In 1933, Congress, determined to undercut these practices and thereby
make another 1929 impossible, embarked upon an ambitious program. The
1. Losses suffered by investors in the few years following the 1929 crash would finance
a few months of a modem war. Between 1920 and 1933, 50 billion dollars worth of securities
were sold in the United States. By 1933, 50% of these were worthless. Stock and bond
losses over the 1929-32 period reached the staggering figure of 93 billion dollars. Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2408, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1950).
2. "Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with little or no attempt to bring
to investors' attention those facts essential to an estimation of the worth of any security.
Whatever may have been the full catalogue of forces that brought to pass the present de-
pression, not least among them has been this wanton misdirection of the capital resources
of the nation." H. R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933).
3. Prior to 1933, speculation by management and chief stockholders in the stock of
their own corporation was an accepted practice. For particularly flagrant examples of in-
sider trading, see Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 2408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 25-6 (1950); Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency on S. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. and 73rd
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1933-34); SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
WORK, AcTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AN FUNCnONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMITTEES, pt. II, 315-51 (1937) (hereinafter cited as PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES).
4. See FTC, Utility Corporations, SEN. Doc. No. 92, pt. 72-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) (hereinafter cited as Utility Corporations); SEC, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVEST-
mENT COMPANIES, pt. IV, 27 et seg. (1942) (hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT COMPANES).
5. Management-dominated reorganizations are discussed in PROTECTIVE COMMIT-
TEES, pt. I, 243-329 (1937).
6. "The power to convert a security . . . connotes the probability that the power
will be exercised when such conversion is most favorable to the 'control'." BERLE AND
MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 187 (1932).
7. The unchallenged discretion of directors to declare dividends at their option gives
them the power, by withholding earnings, to deprive one group of shareholders of their
share in these earnings and hand it over to another class. Id at 193.
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initial legislation was built on the premise that full and fair disclosure would
enable investors to protect their own interests. The Securities Act of 1933
required issuers in primary public distributions to disclose to every investor
all relevant information about corporate affairs and personalities." The
SEC, established in 1934 to enforce the provisions of the act, demanded
specific disclosure of the identities of "controlling persons." 9 Under the
Securities Act, complete disclosure was also made a prerequisite to secondary
public distributions, but such disclosure was limited to distributions by
"controlling persons" involving the use of an underwriter.10
Congress next directed its attention to the abuses of holding and invest-
ment companies. This time, however, affirmative regulation rather than
mere disclosure was deemed necessary. Holding company abuses were most
flagrant in the public utility industry-an industry boasting the largest
8. Securities Act of 1933, § 5 and Schedule A, 48 STAT. 77, 88 (1933), 15 USC §§ 77a,
77aa (1946).
9. Securities Act Form S-1, Item 2 requires disclosure of the "parents" of the reg-
istrant. "Parent" is defined by SEC Rule 405 as any person or company "controlling" the
registrant. 17 CODE FED. REG. § 230-405 (1949).
10. Securities Act §§ 5 and 4(1) make registration mandatory only for public distri-
butions by the issuer or distributions made by an underwriter or dealer. "Underwriter"
is defined in § 2(11) as a person participating in the distribution of securities on behalf of
an "issuer." But "issuer" is defined for purposes of 2(11) to include anyone "directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect
common control with the issuer." Other exemptions applicable to certain types of securities
and security transactions are contained in §§ 3 and 4 of the Act.
There are other "control" provisions in the Securities Act. The SEC may demand
consolidated balance sheets from issuers and their "controlling" persons under § 19. Sec-
tion 15 imposes joint and several liability upon persons who "control" violators of civil
liability provisions of the Act where the "controlling" persons know of or have reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence of the violation. On the surface, this provision appears
to make at least majority stockholders automatically liable for deficiencies in the registration
statement, but no suit under § 15 seems yet to have been brought against any "controlling"
person. But see Petersen Engine Co., 2 S.E.C. 893, 904 (1937) (that the facts "might well be
construed by the courts to impose liability upon the registrant as a 'controlling person' ").
The dearth of litigation under § 15 may be ascribed to the prosperity of the security market
in the period since the passage of the act during which none of the civil liability provisions
in the act have been extensively used. See Comment, Civil Liability under the Federal
Securities Act, 50 YALE L.J. 90 (1940).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1946), also
employed "control" provisions. Issuers of listed securities must file registration statements
with the SEC disclosing "controlling" persons. § 12. Assoc. Gas & Electric Co., 11 S. E. C.
975 (1942). Brokers and dealers must file information about "controlling" persons with
their license applications. § 15. Charles E. Rogers, 3 S.E.C. 597 (1938). And SEC Rule
X-15C1-5, 17 CODE FED. REG. § 240.15ci-5 (1949), requires a broker or dealer to inform
customers if he is under the "control" of the issuer of the security involved in the transac-
tion. Section 20 imposes civil liability upon persons "controlling" violators of the Securities
Exchange Act. This section, however, in contrast to its counterpart § 15 of the Securities
Act, has been employed to hold an exchange brokerage firm civilly liable for the defrauding
tactics of its wire correspondent. Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85
F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
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number of investors in the country." Here Congress struck first. Under-
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, gas and electric holding
companies which exercised a "controlling influence" over operating sub-
sidiaries were brought under SEC supervision.12 The act was made broad'
enough to cover any company in a position to exploit its subsidiaries-from
the fully integrated holding company to the company which existed only
to invest in its subsidiaries.
Investment companies exercising a "controlling influence" over their-
operating subsidiaries were placed under SEC supervision by the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940. Here, however, Congress was unwilling to
interfere with integrated industrial empires. It therefore defined an invest-
ment company as a company whose primary function is to invest in its sub-
sidiaries. Holding companies employed primarily to operate subsidiaries
over which they have a "controlling influence" were exempt from the Act.
13
This exemption was phrased ambiguously enough, however, to leave to the
SEC a choice of restricting the exemption to integrated holding companies
or extending it to companies exercising a "controlling influence" short of
actual directive power over their subsidiaries.
The third phase of investor legislation focussed on bondholders. Con-
gress struck at a long-established practice whereby issuers and underwriters.
appointed bond indenture trustees whom they "controlled" and whose
cooperation was assured in subsequent bond defaults and reorganizations.
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 automatically disqualified any bond
trustee in a "control" relationship with either issuer or underwriter.14
All four statutes had one thing in common. Vital to their success was
the proper interpretation and application of the terms "control" and "con-
trolling influence." The responsibility of giving meaning to these words was
delegated in all four instances to the SEC. After almost seventeen years of
administration it is possible to evaluate the SEC's performance, and to




Before 1933, investors had no way of finding out who was in "control" of
an issuer. 15 It might be a fraudulent promotor with a flagrant record of
11. 10SECANN. REP. 158 (1945).
12. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 (1946) (hereinafter cited as Holding Company Act).
13. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1946).
14. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1946).
15. There were of course blue sky laws in some 46 states. Many required registration
information of the issuer, but they varied widely in substance and degree of enforcement and
could not reach sales outside their particular state. An effective law could therefore be-
avoided by conducting sales interstate so that the actual "sale" would take place in a more
lenient jurisdiction. Most authorities agreed on the ineffectiveness of blue sky laws in
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criminal indictments and civil suits, or a professional promotor whose
previous selling ventures had been notorious failures.16 On the other hand,
the investor often had as much to fear from "control" groups which were
super-respectable. Giant corporations often sold securities in subsidiaries
which they planned to run for their own benefit.'7 Financial wizards, like
Gianninnis of the Bank of America, financed obstensibly independent
brokerage firms and then used them to carry on large-scale market opera-
tions in the stock of other corporations which they dominated.' 8 Without
knowledge of who these "controlling" persons were, the investor was a
pawn in their hands. One of the best ways to judge the prospects of a new
issue is to evaluate the honesty and ability of the men who will run the
corporation. Investors, left in the dark, were deprived of this opportunity.
They were, moreover, unlikely to recognize the hand of "controlling" per-
sons in later corporate action which might discriminate against their in-
terests.' 9
supplying investors with needed information about the issuer. See Hearings before House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 95-1-1
(1933).
16. "I recall, for instance, one case . . . in which a promoter in New York, living in
a building having four different entrances, one on 5th Avenue, one on Forty-second Street,
one on Forty-Third Street, and a back alley entrance, promoted a great many companies
and used the different addresses. . . . He got away with a great deal of money on several
promotions and was finally picked up . . . after he had collected from widows and orphans
about $100,000." Testimony of John Hill, id. at 153; Charles E. Rogers, 3 S. E. C. 597 (1938)
(license revocation proceeding under Securities Exchange Act in which "controlling" person
had been previously convicted on a mail fraud charge); Light, Wofsey & Benesch Inc.
Exchange Act Rel. No. 4052(1948) (license application denied where "controlling" person
had been guilty of violating Securities Act in predecessor firm.); 15 SEC ANN. REP. 19
(1949) (failure to disclose previous cease and desist orders issued against the registrant's
sale of mining securities.); Sweet's Steel Company, 4 S. E. C. 589 (1939) (previous sponsor-
ship of another small and unsuccessful steel issue motive for concealing underwriting arrange-
ment with and "control" over present steel issuer).
17. See, e.g., 15 SEC ANN. REp. 17-18 (1949) (exchange of subsidiary's old preferred
for new preferred resulting in special benefit to parent corporation undisclosed to other
investors); BERLE, STUDIES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 154 (1928) (". . . A subsidiary cor-
poration will float an issue of securities, using the proceeds to support other ventures in
-which the subsidiary itself is not directly interested.").
The problem of the subsidiary investor is a numerically significant one. Sixty of the
200 largest non-financial corporations studied by the SEC in 1940 were under the "control"
-of other corporations. GOLDSMITH & PARMELEE, DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERsmP IN 200
LARGEST NoN-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 109-10 (TNEC Monograph 29,1940).
18. See Walston & Co., 7S. E. C. 937 (1940).
19. SEC registration forms have given the investor a good start toward recognizing
"control" abuses of the most familiar kind. The following must be disclosed in the registra-
tion statement: names of purchasers to whom securities were sold at a discount during the
six months before filing or would be sold in the future; the names of vendors and purchase
prices of property sold within past five years not in the ordinary course of business and the
relationship of all such vendors to the issuers; material corporate loans to affiliates or con-
trolling persons, material contracts providing for the issuer's management; names of all
owners of 10% equity in corporations; servicing contracts with any of the issuer's affiliates;
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To supply the needed information, the Securities Act of 1933 required all
issuers of new securities to file registration statements with the SEC and to
distribute prospectuses to the public.2" The exact contents of these state-
ments were left to the SEC.21 Early in its administration the Commission
ruled that all prospectuses and registration statements must identify the
"controlling" persons in the issuing corporation. 22
But granted the wisdom of disclosing "control," the real problem was
defining it. Expressly repudiating judicial criteria of "control" which in-
clined toward a 50% stock ownership figure, 23 the Commission defined
"econtrol" as "the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management or policies of a corporation
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 24
With the abandonment of a near-50% figure of stock ownership as a
requisite of "control," the ranks of "controlling" persons grew. A chief
stockholder owning less than a majority of stock, but consistently holding
a sufficient number of proxies to elect a majority of directors, was held by
the Commission to "control. ' 25 His "control" was self-perpetuating: he
the interests of any affiliate in property bought or sold by the corporation not in the ordinary
course of business. Securities and Exchange Act-Form S-1. Such disclosure has obviously
deterred control and insider abuses. See 12 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1947) (issuer cancelled
proposed arrangement to sell all goods through officer-controlled companies); 13 id. 20
(1948) (issuer forced to disclose that agreed purchase of stock of controlling affiliate's sub-
sidiary resulted in 2 million dollar profit to the controlling affiliate).
But in spite of all these leads, the investor still needs to be told outright who "controls"
the corporation. See Doris Ruby Mining Co., 4 S.E.C. 427,430 (1939).
20. Securities Act § 5.
21. Securities Act § 19.
22. See note 9 supra. Failure to disclose the name of the "controlling" person in the
registration statement constituted a material omission. Investment Corp. of North America,
5 S.E.C. 287, 292 (1939). This omission warranted a stop order proceeding against the issuer
under section 8(d) of the Act. Until the issuer made full disclosure of those in "control," he
could not lawfully market his securities publicly. SEC Rule 410 allows the issuer to disclaim
"control" in cases of doubt, but it requires him to state all the material facts about any
questionable "control" relationships in the registration statement. 17 CODE FED. REGS.
§ 230.410 (1949).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912) (46%); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (75%). But see Hyams v. Calumet &
Heckla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529, 541 (6th Cir. 1915) ("a control purposely gained and
exercised by a minority stockholder with the aid of the proxies of other stockholders may
have the same effect as control by an actual stock majority"). The "doctrine of the domi-
nant shareholder" usually imposed the fiduciary duty of a management official upon ma-
jority stockholders only. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). The
ambiguous legal status of pre-1933 non-majority "control groups" is discussed in BERLE
& MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 233-45.
Since 1933, however, courts have adopted the more flexible "control" criteria intro-
duced by administrative agencies. See, e.g., Rochester Telephone Co. v. FCC, 307 U.S.
125 (1939); Timberg, Corporate Fictions, 46 COL. L. REv. 533, 561 (1946).
24. SEC Rule 405.
25. See, e.g., Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1120 (1940) (shareholder
owned 18% stock but held proxies for over 50%).
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could rely on the directors whom he elected for access to the proxy machin-
ery in the next election. Only a rival stockholder willing to engage in a
proxy fight, or a rebellious management denying him access to the proxy
machinery, could unseat him. Similarly, several minority stockholders
who voted their stock together over a period of time, elected a slate of
harmonious directors, and frequently consulted together on corporate
policy were usually deemed to be in joint "control" of the corporation.
8
The Commission found, moreover, that "control" can be wielded in more
subtle ways. In a corporation where the board of directors does little more
than rubber stamp executive committee decisions the man who chooses
the executive committee is the real "controlling" person. 27 In other cor-
porations, the underwriter who demands the undated resignations of a
majority of directors as the price of his underwriting contract is in "con-
trol." 2 Even a major creditor who shares in profits and losses and main-
tains an option to exchange his "loan" for equity in the firm may be a "con-
trolling" person. 29 In no case does the Commission look to actual use of
Berle and Means call this "minority control" and discuss it at length in MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 80-4 (1932). The SEC found that about half of
the 200 largest non-financial corporations in the United States were "minority controlled."
GOLDSMITH & PAIMELEE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 103-4.
26. The SEC made people in joint control register as "controlling persons." Invest-
ment Company of North America, 5 S. E. C. 287 (1939) (2 shareholders had voting control
together; effectuated capital and basic financial changes in corporation jointly); Sweet's
Steel Co., 4 S. E. C. 589 (1939) (5 banks together owned almost a majority of shares; man-
aged the steel company jointly).
The courts agreed with the SEC. Landay v. United States, 108 F.2d 698 (6th Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 681 (1940) (defendants voted holdings in a bloc to control the
corporation; held jointly liable for violating Securities Act). The SEC found in its study of
200 corporations that "The dominant position in a large corporation is but rarely embodied
in a single block of stock owned directly by one individual or one corporation. As a rule there
exist a number of separate holdings which are more or less connected and which actually vote
and act in unison. ... When such a community of interest is based on joint dependence on
each other's stock holdings as a means of maintaining a dominant position, a substantial
degree of stability results." GOLDSMITH & PARMELEE, op. cit. supra note 17, at 101.
27. See, e.g., International Resources Corp., 7 S.E.C. 689, 716 (1940). Boards of di-
rectors, in general, are unavoidably dependent upon corporate officers for information. As a
result, in three quarters of the cases studied by the TNEC the board did little more than
ratify decisions of management. Legally, however, the board is still universally recognized
as the ultimate governing body of the corporation. DInOcK & HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND
TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS 24 (TNEC Monograph 11, 1940). See, generally,
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1934); Comment, The Execu-
tive Committee in Corporate Organization, 42 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1943).
28. Canusa Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 548 (1937). For subtler methods of control by
underwriter over issuer see pages 318-9 and note 35 infra.
29. Sweet's Steel Co., 4 S. E. C. 589 (1939) ("controlling" person held a majority of
shares on which he exercised voting and dividend rights as collateral for a loan); Walston &
Co., 7 S. E. C. 937 (1940) ("controlling" person contributed about 90% firm's capital and
chief source of business, shared in profits and losses, and maintained an option to acquire
legal title to any portion of firm he desired).
Other legal devices such as the holding company or the voting trust are familiar levers
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the power to direct corporate policy. By definition, power alone suffices.3°
The Commission's broad definition, however, has not been applied to
all types of "control" which it might reasonably cover. In large corpora-
tions, for example, management may itself "control" where no shareholder
is large enough to compel access to the corporation's proxy machinery. 3'
While such "control" is often difficult to discover, it is obvious enough in
corporations with a perpetual management group and no shareholder owning
more than a small proportion of the voting stock. Disclosure of such "con-
trol," where possible, would be of utmost benefit to investors. On guard
against management, they would be more likely to discern dishonest or
notoriously inefficient managers and refuse to invest. Or, having invested,
they might make diligent use of their proxy votes in choosing management
officials. They might also give serious consideration to matters requiring
of control to the SEC. See Equity Corporation, 2 S. E. C. 675, 680-84 (1937), for an amaz-
ingly complicated system of control employing both devices. Commissioner Healy, con-
curring, was provoked to say: ". . . I cannot resist commenting upon the bewildering maze
of corporations involved in the transactions described and upon the labyrinthic course of
the transactions themselves among these artificial beings, these corporate slaves, called into
existence by those who move them about and control them more completely than ever a
master ordered the lives and acts of human slaves. The most remarkable aspect of all is that
through our legislatures' "liberalizing" of corporation laws and changing by statute the
common law rules against intercorporate holdings, it is we ourselves who have made it
possible." Id. at 689.
30. See Canusa Gold Mines Ltd., 2 S. E. C. 548, 555 (1937). ("The Item [calling for
disclosure of controlling persons] is directed solely to the existence of the power.") (Em-
phasis added.) Compare the SEC's emphasis on the existence rather than the exercise of
control with the judicial notion that a chief shareholder cannot be held responsible for the
acts of his corporate alter ego unless he has somehow exercised his controlling power in
such a way as to disregard the corporate entity. See Horowitz, Disregarding t7W Entity of
Private Corporations, 14 WASH. L. REv. 285 (1939) and 15 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1940); BERLE
& MEANs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 237. ("The only conclusion which could be drawn [from
judicial treatment of control groups] was that where an individual or group had in fact
exercised the powers of management, they must be governed by the same standards of con-
duct as those applied to the formal management ... .") (Emphasis added.)
31. See GOLDSMITH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 103, who estimates that 60 out of 200
corporations surveyed by the SEC were probably controlled by management relying on the
power of the proxy machinery. Yet management holdings in these corporations averaged
only 5% of the total stock holdings. Id. at 56. Famous examples of giant management-
controlled corporations are: American Telephone and Telegraph (where the largest share-
holder owns less than 1% of the voting stock), Bethlehem Steel, Eastman Kodak, General
Electric, Montgomery Ward, Paramount Pictures, etc. There are cases, however, of stock-
holders with as little as 15% voting stock being able to commandeer a majority of proxies
to oust a rebellious or uncooperative management in command of the corporation's proxy
machinery. See BERLE & MRANs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 82-4.
Berle and Means see management control as the inevitable result of the continued
growth of corporations to a point where no shareholder can hope to amass enough stock or
proxies to control management. If this should occur, any distinction between the "control"
group and management would become an academic question, since they would be the same.
Id. at 84-9.
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shareholder approval.12 Where management control defies discovery, how-
ever, the SEC is in most cases powerless. For in such circumstances, in-
vestor protection can be achieved only through the type of rigorous govern-
ment surveillance over management which prevails in the closely-regulated
public utility and investment company fields.33
A second type of control which may not be revealed in the registration
statement is that stemming from monopoly. In a monopolistic industry,
the leaders may "control" price, production, and sales policies of their
"competitors" or even their "customers." 34 Disclosure of such "control,"
however, would do little good. Unless the investor refrains from investing
in a diseased industry altogether, he cannot avoid the effects of monopoly
control. Investor protection in this field lies beyond the scope of security
legislation. Only enforced competition can provide the investor with the
autonomy which he is supposed to have.
The underwriting business may be a special example of monopoly con-
trol. The trade practice is for one underwriter to handle all the financial
business of a particular issuer. Ordinarily no other underwriter will solicit
that firm's business. 35 As a result, it has been charged that underwriters
can generally dictate the nature, timing, and price of their "customers' "
32. For a discussion of SEC proxy rules, which make such alternatives possible for the
shareholder, their limited application, and general worth see Emerson & Latcham, SEC
Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L. J. 635
(1950).
The SEC, on occasion, has found a corporate officer to be "controlling" in connection
with investment company regulation. See note 95 infra. His "control" stemmed from his
influence with the major stockholders rather than from his official position. Transit Invest-
ment Co., Inv. Co. Rel. 927 (1946).
33. Former SEC Chairman, now Supreme Court Justice Douglas criticized the Securi-
ties Act in 1934 for doing nothing which "controls the powers of self-perpetuating manage-
ment." He supported a "control which would combine regulation by industry with supervi-
sion by the government." He admitted, however, that such supervision might engage the
government in "activity a thousand fold more complex than the analogous activity of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. . .".. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV.
(NS) 521, 528, 532 (1934).
34. See LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL IN AM 1ERICAN INDUSTRY, 410 (1931);
BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 69-70, 120-1.
35. "Market sharing normally characterizes the investment banking field. . . .They
do not compete for corporate stocks and bonds. Each investment house has its territory
where others do not intrude. Houses do not solicit business from a corporation that is deal-
ing with another firm. They do not bid on securities that have been offered to others ...
Issuers of securities, in effect, are allocated among the members of the trade. . . ." WILCOX,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 176-7 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1941).
For the effect of investment banking monopoly on the issuer's financial policies, see IWeston,
The Economies of Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Securities, 16 U. Cm. J. Bus. 1, 18 (1943).
Formerly, investment banker domination over issuer's financial policies was insured by
the maintenance of a representative of the investment banker on the issuer's board. OwENS,
BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION 355-67 (1934). But regulatory legislation in
the banking, trust indenture, public utility, and investment company field have attacked
such a practice. See, e.g., Holding Company Act § 17(c).
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security issues. 6 Investor protection, sorely needed, could not be gained
by disclosure.3 7 For this reason, perhaps, the SEC has not insisted upon
disclosure of monopoly control between issuer and underwriter. More
extreme measures are needed. Antitrust regulation of the underwriting
business, for example, might insure arm's-length bargaining between issuers
and underwriters.3 Short of this, the SEC might be empowered to prescribe
competitive bidding among underwriters for the business of all corporate
issuers. The Commission already possesses this power over public utility
issues, and an extension to all issues might well free corporate financial
policy from underwriter "control." 11
Secondary Distributions by "Controlling Persons"
The Securities Act's registration and prospectus requirements for new
36. Investors suffer when underwriters dictate floating of excessive security issues
primarily to collect the fees involved. The Congressional Report on the Securities Act in
1933 stressed the fact that ". . . investment bankers with no regard for the efficient func-
tioning of industry forced corporations to accept new capital for expansion purposes in
order that new securities might be issued for public consumption." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1933). Moreover, the fees charged by monopolistic underwriters may be
excessive, resulting in higher prices for the investor.
37. While the SEC presently requires that the issuer disclose any underwriter with
whom it is in a "control" relationship, Registration Form S-1, Item 12, this requirement
results in disclosure of only those rare cases in which the underwriter actually "controls"
or is under "common control with" the issuer's management in all corporate matters. See,
e.g., Southeastern Industrial Loan Co., 10 S. E. C. 617 (1941) (underwriter and registrant
were both "controlled" corporations of same parent); Reiter-Foster Oil Corp., 6 S. E. C.
1028, 1043 (1940) (underwriter had "control" of issuer's board). A second reason might be
the difficulty of discovering such "control." The SEC's experience with administering Utility
Rule U-12F-2 which denied underwriting fees to anyone in such a relationship with the
issuer "that there is liable to be . . . an absence of arms-length-bargaining" indicates that
the exact degree of influence in the issuer-underwriter area is often too difficult to determine.
See SEC, THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING ARm's LENGTH BARGAINING AND COMPETITIVE
CONDITIONS IN THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES OF REGISTERED PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING CoMPANIEs AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES 8-9 (1940); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC,
126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1942), affirming Dayton Power and Light Co., 8 S. E. C. 950 (1941);
Blair & Co., 12 S. E. C. 661 (1943). Indeed, the SEC abandoned its attempt to administer
this provision in 1941 and adopted instead a rule of compulsory bidding for all utility secu-
rities. SEC Rule U-50. Holding Co. Rel. 2676 (1941).
38. A suit against 17 major Eastern investment banking houses for violating the Sher-
man Act has been instituted in the Southern District of New York. N. Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1950, p. 51, col. 5.
39. The controversial issue of competitive bidding for all corporate issuers has been
discussed heatedly for almost 10 years, especially since the adoption in 1941 of Rule U-50
providing for compulsory bidding for public utility securities. At present the SEC has no
power to prescribe competitive bidding for other types of issuers. See Holding Co. Rel.
No. 2676 (1941), expressly disclaiming any such power. For the arguments pro and con
compulsory bidding see WESTON, op. cit. supra note 35 (conservative approval); MCCLINTOCK,
COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR NEW ISSUES OF SECURITIES (1939) (indignant disapproval);
EMBLEN, COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOP CORPORATE SECURITIES (1944) (argument analyses).
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issues apply only to public distributions by the issuer.40 Corporations may
and do place many issues privately with a select number of corporate
"insiders." 41 Such issues are exempt from the Act's disclosure requirements
because at the time of issue they in no way affect the small investor. But
should these "insiders" later decide to sell their holdings to the public, the
need for disclosure would then be as imperative as in original public dis-
tributions. 42 Indeed, where an "insider" offers his unregistered stock to the
public, an additional need for disclosure exists. Without it, the "insider"
alone has access to vital information about the corporation's affairs, and is
therefore in a position to extract secret profits from his unwary purchasers. 43
40. Securities Act § 4(1) exempts from regulation "transactions by an issuer not in-
volving any public offering." For a discussion of the numerous factors, besides number of
offerees, which are considered by the SEC in determining whether or not an offering is
"public", see, McCoRMIcK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE SEC 101-5
(1948); Sec. Act Rel. 285 and 603 (1935).
Sections 3 and 4 contain other exemptions for particular types of securities and trans-
actions, even when publicly distributed. The applicability of these exemptions to secondary
distributions by "controlling" persons is discussed in Heineman, Secondary Distributions and
Continuing Exemptions under the Securities Act, 34 ILL. L. REv. 812 (1940).
41. Private placements have accelerated since the passage of the Securities Act. In-
stitutional investors, i.e., insurance companies, constitute one of the most important classes
of security purchasers and take almost all of their holdings through private placement. In
1938, the 26 largest life insurance companies owned 10% of our total industrial debt, 17.4%
of all railroad debt, and 18.2% of all utility debt. TNEC Hearings, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.,
pt. 10-A (1940).
Institutional investors, of course, present much less of a danger to investors when they
later sell their holdings than ordinary corporate insiders. For one thing, their skilled in-
vestment analysts will prevent them from buying unsound stock. Secondly they are not so
likely to sell out for profit on advance information of price declines, since they are not in-
terested in speculative profits. Presumably they will refrain from interference in the cor-
porate management. In fact, the welfare of the institutional investor has attracted more
attention than the welfare of the investors to whom he sells. In 1941, a proposed amendment
to the Securities Act would have required issuers who sold private placed securities to in-
stitutional investors to register them so that the institution would have the benefit of
required disclosures. SEC, REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AmENDMENTS TO SECURITIES ACT,
etc., 1, 18-19 (1941).
In 1949, the SEC estimated that $2,657,000,000 in securities were privately placed as
compared with a total of $3,443,000,000 distributed publicly in the same year. 15 SEC ANN.
REP. 7 (1949).
For a discussion of private placements and their effect upon the investment banking
field in general, see McCoRmicK, op. cit. supra note 40, at 294-5; McCLINTocK, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 25-69; WESTON, op. cit. supra note 35, at 42-3.
42. See Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the Securities Act, 4 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 117 (1937): "To the small investor it is relatively immaterial
whether his securities derive from the issuer directly or from some large holder who has
undertaken a liquidation of his holdings. The need for basic information as to the factual
background of the security may be as great in one case as the other." See also SEC, REPORT
ON SECONDARY DISTIBUTION OF ExcaANGE STOCKS 5, 8 (1942) (hereinafter cited as SEC-
ONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS).
43. "In the Commission's experience, abuse of inside information has been particularly
prevalent in the case of securities which are not the subject of reporting. . . ." PURCELL,
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But Congress, in regulating secondary distributions, paid insufficient
heed to the need for disclosure. The Securities Act demands of the cor-
poration a registration statement and prospectus in secondary distributions
only when made through an underwriter by a person "controlling, con-
trolled by or under common control with the corporation." 44 Congress
gave two reasons for drawing the line at "controlling" persons: only one
in "control" can compel the corporation's management to undertake the
burden of registering; and of those with access to inside information, "con-
trolling" shareholders are most likely to distribute a sufficient quantity of
stock to warrant investor protection against exploitation.
4"
In assuming that only a "controlling" person can compel registration,
Congress placed the SEC in a dilemma. The Commission applied the same
tests of "control" in requiring registration of secondary distributions which
it had established in compelling disclosure in all registrations. 4 But even
FOSTER & HILL, CORPORATIONS: ENFORCING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CORPORATE MAN-
AGEMENT AND THE RELATED AcTrIvrrEs OF TE S. E. C. 53 (1946). "Abuses ... may (occur)
... in a period of radical decline, when insiders seek to dispose of their holdings before
information becomes public which may depress market values." Ibid.
A large proportion of secondary distributions in listed securities is made by corporate
insiders. SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS, op. Cit. supra note 42, at 2, 40 (1942).
44. See note 10 supra. This requirement applies whether or not the securities have
initially been registered. When secondary distributions of registered securities by "con-
trolling" persons take place, the issuer and underwriter may be liable for any deficiencies in
the old registration statement or prospectuses attributable to the time lag between initial and
secondary distributions. See Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the Secu-
rities Act of 1933,4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 89, 119, 125 (1937).
In 1945, $193,870,000 of securities involved in secondary distributions were registered
for cash sale. 15 SEC ANN. REP. 4 (1949).
A "controlling" shareholder may still distribute his unregistered holdings personally
-or through a broker on the floor of the exchange as long as no solicitation is involved. In
neither of these cases does he employ an underwriter. He is therefore exempt from dis-
closure requirements under § 2(11). In actual practice, however, it is practically impossible
to distribute much stock by such methods. See McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra note 40, at
68-9.
45. See H.R. REP. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-4 (1933): "All the outstanding stock of
a particular corporation may be owned by one individual or a select group of individuals.
At some future date they may wish to dispose of their holdings and to make an offer of this
stock to the public. Such a public offering may possess all the dangers attendant upon a new
,offering of securities. Whenever such a distribution reaches significant proportions, the
distributor would be in a position to control the issuer, and thus be able to furnish the in-
formation demanded by the bill. This being so, the distributor is treated as an equivalent
to the original issuer, and if he seeks to dispose of the issue through a public offering, he
becomes subject to the Act."
46. E.g., Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S. E. C. 1111 (1940) (president owned 18% of
stock but "controlled" through proxy votes); Resources Corp. International, 7 S. E. C. 689
(1940) (stockholder owned 27% of stock but "controlled" through domination of officers
and executive committee). See pages 315-16 and notes 25-30 supra.
See McCoRmIcK, op. cit. supra note 40, at 69: "In determining whether a person may
be deemed an issuer within ... 2(11) . . . the Commission has taken the position that
-control means that degree of influence over the management and policies of the" issuing cor-
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though a shareholder met these tests and was therefore presumed to be able
to compel registration, he often contended that he could not do so. If such
a contention were untrue and the Commission swallowed it, collusion be-
tween "controlling" persons and corporations to avoid disclosure would
be encouraged.47 If, on the other hand, the shareholder's plea, though
actually true, were denied by the Commission, the net effect would be an
unjustified destruction of the liquidity of his capital. 48 Congress might have
spared the Commission such embarrassment by empowering it to requisition
statements from management, at the shareholder's expense, whenever it
determined that a shareholder was "controlling." 41 Or Congress might
have required issuers placing their securities privately to incorporate into
their contracts of sale a provision promising cooperation with shareholders
in any future registration deemed necessary by the SEC."0
poration as would enable the owner of the securities to obtain registration thereof by the
corporation."
Securities Act § 6 requires the issuer and its management to sign a registration state-
ment before it can become effective.
47. See Testimony of Rush S. Dickson, Hearings before House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 617 (1941). In the case cited,
a stockholder in a family corporation claimed that he could not get the cooperation of the
management for registration although it was urgent that he dispose of his holdings im-
mediately. Although it is possible that other members of his family with whom he may have
enjoyed cordial business relations in the corporation would refuse him this favor, the
possibilities for collusion in such a situation are obvious.
48. See note 47 supra. In that case the SEC insisted on registration and apparently
forced the stock to be distributed intrastate. Such a restriction causes great inconvenience
and financial loss to the stockholder. Curtailment of a shareholder's right to convert his
securities into liquid cash is perhaps the most serious consequence of a finding of "control"
in any of the five Acts, particularly where the shareholder's major assets are tied up in the
stock and he needs the cash quickly. The consequences of "control" under the other Acts,
labeling of the shareholder as "controlling" in the registration statement, imposition of
certain affirmative duties upon him, or even prohibition of his right to act in certain fiduciary
capacities are not potentially as disastrous.
49. See Holding Company Act § 18 for an example of comprehensive information-
getting powers already accorded the SEC. Issuers might legitimately fear the potential
civil liability which the Act would impose for deficiencies in registration statements or
prospectuses filed pursuant to such contracts for secondary distributions. An amendment
requiring "controlling" persons to sign the registration statement in secondary distributions
for their benefit might allay the issuer's fears. For the defrauded investor could then sue the
"controlling" person directly as a signer of the registration statement without the necessity
of proving his "control" over the management or other signers of the statement. See SEC,
PROPOSALS FOR AIENDM NTS TO THE SECURITIES AcT, etc. 24 (1941).
Either provision, however, could still result in needless expense for the shareholder if
he were erroneously deemed "controlling" by the SEC. On the inevitable margin for error
in such determinations of "control" see Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation
Under the Securities Laws, 26 IowA L. REv. 241, 252-4 (1941). The average cost of registra-
tion is estimated by the SEC at $1 per $1,000 publicly raised. Opponents of extended regis-
tration requirements estimate that registration of a $100,000 issue costs $5,000. See Hearings
before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344, 77th 'Cong., 1st
Sess. 582, 617 (1941).
50. Insurance companies customarily require such promises when they buy privately-
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But even if the obstacle to registration were thus hurdled, the act would
still fall short of protecting investors against insider sell-outs of unregistered
securities. The principal fallacy of the statute lies in Congress' second
basic assumption that the only insiders to be feared are those in control.
Underlying this assumption was an unwillingness to subject small distribu-
tions unlikely to affect more than a few investors to disclosure requirements.
But the truly small distribution is already protected by Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act. Under this section, the SEC has exempted from registration
all secondary distributions under $100,000. 51 An insider distributing secu-
rities in excess of that amount should be compelled to register. Whether he
is controlling or not, he has access to vital information with which to ex-
ploit uninformed investors. Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which strips insiders of short-term trading profits, is applicable to
any director, officer, or holder of 10% of the corporate equity. 2 Congress
should adopt similar standards as a prima facie test for determining whether
a shareholder selling his stock is likely to hold an advantage over the public
by virtue of his inside information.
5 3
THE HOLDING COMPANY IN CONTROL
The affirmative regulatory phase of Congress' program opened with an
attack upon holding companies. "Control" over several operating sub-
placed securities. It seems clear that Congress too might require that such a promise be
incorporated in every security contract made by an issuer in interstate commerce. The
Trust Indenture Act used such a device. It requires every debt security sold through inter-
state commerce to be accompanied by an indenture contract incorporating an obligation on
the part of issuer and trustee to submit periodically, or when the SEC wishes, certain types
of information. §§ 313 and 314. In like manner, issuers might be required to incorporate in
their contracts a promise to furnish information as required by the SEC in future registra-
tions. See Securities Act § 14. For indications that the constitutionality of such a require-
ment would be upheld, see Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1935); Coplin v. U.S.,
88 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1937).
51. Securities Act, Regulation A, The floor for primary distributions is presently
$300,000. Sec. Act Rel. 3066 (1945).
Secondary distributions of listed securities studied by SEC ranged in value from
$25,000 to several million dollars. The average number of shares involved in secondary
distributions is often several times larger than the number of those shares traded on an ex-
change in several weeks. SEcoNDARY DISTRIBUTIONS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 2, 31 (1942).
52. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1946). On
§ 16(b) generally, see Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders:
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MicH. L. REv. 133 (1939).
53. The adoption of an inflexible test for insiders based upon a stock ownership figure
like the 10% one contained in 16b would not be advisable. Rather the Holding Company
Act technique of a presumption of "inside information" based upon a stock ownership
figure would give the SEC greater leeway in regulating distributions by people who are
insiders by dint of factors other than stock ownership. Perhaps a compromise might be
worked. Ten percent equity ownership might conclusively render its owner an insider in
the corporation. Lack of 10% ownership, on the other hand, would not conclusively preclude
a stockholder from being adjudged an insider.
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sidiaries was often concentrated in the hands of a few people by a small in-
vestment in holding company stock. These people were then in a position
to drain off subsidiary earnings through interlocking directorates or officer-
ships and through intercompany transactions.
4
Public utility holding companies were notorious examples. Sixteen giant
holding company systems dominated 90% of the electric utility industry in
the early thirties.5 Each system consisted of tiers of holding companies
with the men in "control" of the top holding company running millions of
dollars worth of utility assets though at times furnishing less than 1% of the
total investment."6 The remainder came chiefly from the public holders of
bonds, hybrid securities, and non-voting stock.57 In good times, the holding
companies creamed off the utility's operating profits in the form of dividends
on their own stock." In bad times, the holding companies drained off sub-
sidiary funds through excessively priced contracts,59 upstream loans from
54. On the holding company as a legal device for acquiring "control," see generally
BONBRIGHT & MEANS, Thn HOLDING COMPANY (1932); Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
55. Utility Corporations 159; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1088, 1092 (1950). The United
Corporation with assets of over 4 billion dollars was the largest of these. Insull, Electric
Bond and Share, Cities Service Co., Associated Gas & Electric Co., Standard Gas & Electric
Co., North American Co. also were on the list.
Holding company control evolved originally in the industry as a by-product of con-
tractual relationships between independent utilities and utility servicing companies. The
utilities often were forced to pay for services in their own securities.
The expansion of utility systems brought about by assistance from servicing companies
benefited the public. But savings from technical advances and centralization should have
been passed on to the consumer instead of being drained off to holding companies.
56. Utility Corporations 169. In the Insull holding company system one dollar in-
vested in the top holding company controlled $2,000 worth of base-line utility property.
Eight holding companies intervened between base-line utilities and the top holding com-
pany. Id. at 160-1.
Holding companies would often sell overvalued property to a utility for the utility's pre-
ferred and common stock. They would then sell the utility's preferred for what the property
originally cost them. In this way they could acquire utility common stock free. See 10 SEC
ANN. REP. 86 (1945).
57. Public-utility financing in the public markets was done largely with nonvoting
securities. Fifty percent of operating utility securities were bonds. BARNEs, EcoNOMIcs OF
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 102 (1947). The Niagara Hudson Power Group, for example,
capitalized its operating companies with 67 million dollars worth of bonds, 24 million dollars
worth of preferred stock, and 8 million dollars worth of voting common. Utility Corporations
99.
58. A pyramided system in which each holding company holds a substantial part of the
common stock of the corporation below may produce an enormous profit for top equity
securities. The smaller the proportion of the common stock of the utility, the larger will be
the holding company's return. The smaller the proportion of the holding company's com-
mon stock, the larger will be the return to the common stock owners. Id. at 73-78.
59. Forty percent of the income of Electric Bond and Share came from servicing fees
for its subsidiary utilities as compared with 27% in dividends or interest, 13% for sale of
investment securities, and 10% for underwriting and financing services. Its subsidiaries
were bound to call on it for all managerial, engineering, and security-marketing services.
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subsidiary to parent,"0 overpayments to interlocking directors and officers,61
inadequate depreciation reserves, 62 unwarranted dividends,63 and sales of
electricity and gas from one operating subsidiary to another at a large
mark-up.64
To protect utility investors and consumers from these abuses, Congress
chose positive SEC regulation in preference to disclosure." The Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 66 subjected gas and electric utility
holding companies and their subsidiaries to Commission supervision over
security issues and acquisitions,17 proxy and dividend policies,63 and capital
structures.69 In addition, it required prior SEC approval of all loans and
servicing or construction contracts between utilities and servicing affiliates
in a holding company system.70
These measures, however, would have fallen short of their goal unless
enforceable against all gas and electric holding companies in a position to
exploit their operating utilities. The Holding Company Act itself took a
step in the right direction by defining a holding company as any company
which owned at least 10% of the voting stock of a utility or another holding
company.7 1 But it specifically excluded from regulation any company
Their profit on management and construction contracts was over 100%. Id. at 352-5, 423,
464.
60. Id. at 461. Loans from subsidiary to parent were, of course, at a lower rate of
interest than simultaneous loans from parent to subsidiary.
61. Id. at 130-5, 152.
62. Id. at 496, 847 et seq.
63. Id. at 440-8.
64. Id. at 851-4.
65. Utility consumers as well as investors were suffering from holding company abuses.
Higher utility operating expenses meant higher rates for consumers. See 10 SEC ANN. REP.
107 (1945). And consumers with no choice but to patronize local utility monopolies could,
of course, gain nothing from disclosure.
State utility regulation, moreover, had proved ineffective. Direct state regulation of
the utility holding company was often impossible because of the interstate character of
holding company systems, political pressures and inadequate state funds. See Comment,
59 YALE L.J. 1088, 1093 (1950).
66. Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1946). For
background of the Act see Utility Corporations (6 year study by the FTC); H.R. REP. No.
827, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1935).
67. Holding Company Act §§ 6,7.
68. Holding Company Act §§ 12(c) and 12(e).
69. Holding Company Act § 11. See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1088 (1950) for an evalua-
tion of utility integration under § 11(b).
70. Holding Company Act §§ 12, 13, 15. Holding companies themselves were forbidden
from performing servicing contracts for their utility subsidiaries under § 13 (a).
71. Holding Company Act § 2(a)(7)(A). Companies falling under § 2(a)(7)(A) were
required to register with the SEC.
Section 2(a)(7)(B) supplied an additional definition applicable to companies which
were not required to register under 2(a)(7)(A). A holding company under 2(a)(7)(B) was
any person which the SEC, in a hearing, determined to have such "a controlling influence'
over the management or policies of a utility or holding company to justify its regulation
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meeting the 10% requirement which could prove to the SEC that it did not
exercise a "controlling influence" over its immediate subsidiary.
72
The Commission announced early that "controlling influence" under the
Holding Company Act required a good deal less than "control" under the
"in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers." Similarly §§ 2(a)(8)
(A) and 2(a) (8) (B) set out the same standards for determining who is a subsidiary.
Occasionally the SEC has regulated holding companies under this grant in 2(a)(7)(B)
or its counterpart 2(a)(8)(B). See Employees Welfare Assoc., 4 S.E.C. 792 (1939) (former
parent still controls through common officer and employees despite lack of stock). In general
however, the time, energy, and expense involved in investigating and initiating hearings on
companies not presumed to be holding companies under the Act preclude extensive use of
2(a) (7)(B) for acquiring jurisdiction over below-10 % companies. For an example of possible
below-10% utility control situations which the SEC has apparently not touched, see IN-
VESTMENT COMPANIES pt. IV, 20-1 (1942).
If the SEC cannot regulate the applicant as a holding company, it may be able to
regulate it as an affiliate. Affiliate is defined for purposes of the Holding Company Act in
§ 2(a)(11) to include any person owning 5% voting stock in a utility or anyone in such a
relation to the utility that there is "liable to be such an absence of arms-length bargaining"
between them as to justify regulation in public interest. See Blair & Co., 12 S.E.C. 661
(1943) for an example of companies which could not be regulated as holding companies but
only as affiliates, in the absence of a finding of "controlling influence." See Note, 51 YALE
L. J. 1018, 1023 (1940).
Many of the most important regulatory sections of the Act, however, apply only to
holding companies and not to affiliates. See, e.g., §§ 6, 7, 11, 12(a)-(d), (h), 13(a). Hence, the
need for a liberal definition of "controlling influence" to bring companies under the Act as
"holding companies" and not merely as "affiliates."
72. Utility Act § 2(a)(7)(B) provides: "The Commission, upon application, shall by
order declare that a company is not a holding company ...if the Commission finds that
the applicant (i) does not ... directly or indirectly control a public utility or holding com-
pany ...by any means or device whatsoever, (ii) is not an intermediary company through
which such control is exercised, and (iii) does not, directly or indirectly, exercise ...such
a controlling influence over the management or policies of any public utility or holding
company as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors and consumers that the applicant be subject to the obligations, duties, and
liabilities imposed in this chapter upon holding companies." Section 2(a)(8)(B) offers
subsidiaries the same opportunity to exempt themselves as subsidiaries by proving that
they are not controlled or subject to a controlling influence by the holding company.
Of the three showings which an applicant for exemption must make, the lack of "con-
trolling influence" is the most difficult.
In practice, the SEC has denied most exemptions when it has found that "controlling
influence" existed between holding company and subsidiary. Occasionally, however, the
Commission decides that regulation is not necessary to the public welfare despite the
existence of "controlling influence." See e.g., Matter of Irving Trust, 1 S.E.C. 273 (1936)
(assets of holding company being liquidated); Matter of Italian Super Power Corporation,
1 S.E.C. 282 (1936) (utility operating abroad and control shared with a foreign govern-
ment); Matter of Lehigh Coal v. Navigation Co., 1 S.E.C. 489 (1936) (holding company
primarily engaged in a non-utility business).
Where the SEC exempts a company because it has no "controlling influence," the ex-
emption is usually conditioned on the retention of the status quo in holding-company sub-
sidiary relations. See, e.g., Matter of Allied Chemical & Dye Co., 5 S.E.C. 151, 156 (1939);
Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation under the Securities Laws, 26 IOwA L.
REv. 241, 252 (1941).
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Securities Act.73 While companies owning neither a majority of subsidiary
stock nor access to its proxy machinery might not have been held to "possess
the power to direct the management or policies" of a subsidiary under the
Securities Act, they could nevertheless possess a "controlling influence"
under the Utility Act.74 If, for example, their only influence over a sub-
sidiary were ownership of a bloc of stock sufficient to veto corporate actions
requiring a Y3 vote, their "controlling influence" would be almost assured.7
Several holding companies, moreover, could exercise "a controlling in-
fluence" over a single utility at the same time. Hence, a holding company
might become subject to regulation with respect to a particular subsidiary
even though another holding company owned a larger portion of the utility's
voting stock or elected a greater share of its directors.I
To prove that they exercised no "controlling influence," parents had to
demonstrate that their subsidiaries were not "susceptible to their control." 7
"Susceptibility to control" might stem from countless sources. It might
result from a few holding company representatives among the utility's di-
rectors or officers working harmoniously with the dominant faction in the
utility's management. 78 It might stem from large purchases of the utility's
energy output by the holding company.79 It could even emerge from "a long-
73. "It seems clear that Congress meant . . . something less in the form of influence
over the management or policies of a company than 'control'...." Byllesby Co., 6 S.E.C.
639, 651 (1940).
74. "The phrase, as here used, does not necessarily mean that those exercising control-
ling influence must be able to carry their point. A controlling influence maybe effective with-
out accomplishing its purpose fully." Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730, 739 (6th
Cir. 1941); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1942).
75. Koppers United Co., 12 S.E.C. 184, 191 (1942) (power to restrain issuance of
preferred stock, consolidation, or change in type of business); Paul Smith's Electric Co.,
9 S.E.C. 648, 655 (1941) (power to block issuance of preferred stock, mortgage of property
to secure a debt, sale of franchises or property, consolidation or dissolution, changing the
certificate of incorporation). But cf. Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation, 5 S.E.C. 151,
155 (1939) (charter amendments required 2 preferred stockholders' consent and applicant
owned Y3; occasions for exercise of this power too rare to constitute "controlling influence").
76. Moreau Mfg. Co., 9 S.E.C. 673 (1941) (holding company in question owned 33%,
2 other holding companies jointly owned 66%); Northern Natural Gas Co., 5 S.E.C. 228
(1939) (three way split between holding company in question and two other holding com-
panies of 35%, 35%, 30%); Paul Smith Electric Co., 9 S.E.C. 548, 652 (1941) (applicant
had 49.6%, other holding company 50.4%).
Most exemptions under § 2(a)(7)(B), in fact, have been claimed on the ground that
another holding company or interest group owned a larger amount of stock or dominated
more directors than the applicant. See BARNES, EcoNoMucs OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
660 (1947); GOLDSMITH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 109-10.
77. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378, 382 (9th Cir. 1942).
78. See Paul Smith Electric Co., 9 S.E.C. 648, 652 (1941) (1 out of 5 directors) Hartford
Gas Co., 8 S.E.C. 758, 761 (1941) (president formally affiliated with alleged holding com-
pany); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 10 S.E.C. 39,47 (1941) (2 out of 15 directors).
79. Moreau Mfg. Co., 9 S.E.C. 673 (1941) (all subsidiary's power sold to one of three
holding companies with equal shareholdings); Hartford Gas Co., 8 S.E.C. 758, 766 (1941)
(utility bought all its, gas from a source controlled by the holding company). Where the
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.established voluntary practice" of conferring or advising the utility on con-
struction, production, or financial matters."0 It could usually be avoided
.only by showing that the holding company was a virtual outcast in the
utility's management, had been denied proportionate representation among
its officers and directors, or had been ignominiously defeated on important
corporate issues.8
"Controlling influence" was easier to come by than get rid of. Holding
companies might create voting trusts to hold their investments in the utili-
ties; but since the trustees were seldom scrupulously independent of any
affiliation with the holding company, this device would inevitably fail.8 2
Officers and directors common to holding company and utility might be re-
moved; but "controlling influence" would linger on in the form of friendly
relationships, past or present, with the subsidiary's new management.83
Holding company proxies might be delegated to the dominant faction in the
utility's management; but unless these proxies were indefinite and irrevoca-
ble they could not erase the tinge of "controlling influence." 84 Very often,
the holding company could escape regulation only by reducing its invest-
ment in a utility to less than 10%, abolishing forever its "latent power to
resume control." 85
purchaser or furnisher of energy is also a large shareholder, "controlling influence" is a
foregone conclusion. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 14 S.E.C. 491, 497 (1942)
(hQlding company owned 29.72% stock, and furnished 43% of the utility's total power
,needs); Chicago District Electric Generating Corp., 2 S.E.C. 10 (1937) (40% voting stock;
purchased 95% of utility's output).
If the rates at which the energy is furnished to the utility are regulated by state utility
,commissions and the holding company is not the largest shareholder it might escape regula-
tion. Lehigh Power Securities Corp., 5 S.E.C. 143, 144 (1939).
80. Manchester Gas Co., 7 S.E.C. 57, 62 (1940) (no voting control, but tax, accounting,
auditing, and engineering consultations. "Controlling influence may spring as readily from
advice constantly sought as from command arbitarily imposed.").
81. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Lines, 9 S.E.C. 370 (1941) (Mokan owned 42% of the
stock, but had been refused directors, and had struggled unsuccessfully to break up Colum-
bia's 51% control); Detroit Edison Co., 7 S.E.C. 968, 975 (1940) (refused recognition on
utility's board despite attempts to force recognition by breaking a quorum). But cf. Chicago
District Electric Generating Company, 2 S.E.C. 10 (1937) (no officers, 2 out of 7 directors,
.other holding company purchased 95 % utility's energy output).
82. Byllesby Co., 6 S.E.C. 639 (1940) (trustees are bound to act in interests of former
controlling person). "We are doubtful that a voting trust can ever operate effectively to
insulate control." ITd. at 654.
83. Hartford Gas Co., 8 S.E.C. 758 (1941), affirm'd, 129 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1942) (utility
president formerly affiliated with holding company).
84. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 10 S.E.C. 39, 50 (1941) (holding company always sent
its proxies to local utility management). Compare Koppers United Co., 12 S.E.C. 184, 188
(1942) (holding company never voted holdings in utility).
On the other hand, leasing of all the utility's assets accompanied by irrevocable proxies
wiped out "controlling influence." Clearfield Bituminous Coal Co., 1 S.E.C. 374 (1936).
85. See Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC. 119 F.2d 730, 739 (6th Cir. 1941); International
Paper and Power Co., 4 S.E.C. 873 (1939) (systematic weeding out of interlocking officers
and turning over of stock holdings to liquidating trustees); 12 SEC ANN. REP. 77-8 (1946)
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The end result of the SEC's interpretation of "controlling influence" was
effective utility regulation.8 It brought under SEC supervision all com-
panies potentially able to exploit utilities through interlocking directorates
and officerships, intercompany transactions, or counselary services. The
Commission then took full advantage of its supervisory power to sterilize
this potential.17
THE INVESTMENT COMPIPA!Y IN CONTROL
In 1940 Congress undertook to regulate a second type of specialized com-
pany-the investment company. A latecomer on the American financial
scene, its prime function was to invest in the securities of diverse industrial
companies, and to distribute its earnings on these securities to its own
shareholders.s Naturally, this scheme appealed to the small, inexperienced
investor. It offered him an opportunity to invest his savings wisely through
skilled investment analysts, and, for the first time, to spread his investment
over the securities of many different firms.9
Diversification, however, was too often ignored by investment com-
panies." Their funds were frequently tied up in a few industrial firms which
their managers "controlled" or aspired to "control." 91 Concentrated in-
(reduction of holding company voting stock ownership in utility to 5.4%a-abolition of
holding company management representatives).
Of course, even though the holding company reduced its holdings below the 10% point,
the SEC was free to go after them under § 2(a) (7) (B). See note 72 supra.
86. See Comment, 40 Micn. L. REv. 274 (1941) for an adverse criticism of the SEC's
interpretation of "controlling influence." For a more favorable comment see Note, 51
YALE L.J. 1018 (1941). The Commission has, however, always been upheld by the courts.
E.g., Public Service Corp. of New Jersey v. SEC, 129 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 691 (1942); 10 SEC ANN. REp. 115 (1945) and cases listed therein. Up to June,
1944, the SEC had approved 164 out of 565 applications for exemption, denied 52, and 317
had been withdrawn or dismissed. Id. at 114.
87. See notes 66-70 supra.
88. The first investment company in America was organized in 1922. By 1926 the idea
was gaining followers rapidly. By 1929, there were well over 600 investment trusts and
related companies in existence and they controlled 4 billion dollars worth of capital. Next
to utility shareholders, investment company subscribers were the most numerous group of
stockholders in the country. See REIs, FALSE SEcurTy 113-4 (1937); 10 SEC ANN. REP.
158 (1945).
Before their introduction into the United States, investment trusts had been popular
on the continent, particularly in England and Switzerland. See Investment Trusts in Great
Britain, H. Doc. No. 380, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
89. See REIs, op. cit. supra note 88, at 113-4. Dr. Leland Rex Robinson, leading author-
ity on investment trusts in the twenties, described the investment company to investors as
follows: "an agency by which the combined funds of different participants are placed in
securities sharing a distribution of risk such as to introduce 'the law of averages' in protection
of the principal; and which aims solely at the safe and reasonably profitable employment
of the subscribed investment funds while definitely avoiding any and all of those responsibil-
ities of control, management, finance, direction, or special interest which are sometimes tied
in with investment." Id. at 114.
90. INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. IV, 22-25.
91. Investment companies may concentrate most of their assets in a few companies
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vestment endangered the security-holders of both the investment company
and its "controlled" companies. Investment company shareholders suffered
disproportionately from subsequent failures of these "controlled" companies
and from last-ditch attempts on the part of the investment company to
save them.9 2 Investors in the "controlled" companies, like investors in
subsidiaries of holding companies, were exploited through forced dividend
payments and through transactions with the investment company's affili-
ates.93
The Investment Company Act of 1940 sought to protect both classes of
investors.94 Under the Act, investment companies were given a choice be-
tween holding themselves out as diversified or non-diversified companies.
If they chose to be called "diversified," they were permitted to invest only
25% of their assets as they pleased. Of the remaining 75%, none could be
for three chief reasons. They may be interested in subsidizing particular companies or in-
dustries until these companies get on their feet and their investment can be resold at a
profit. This is intermediary banking or industrial finance. They may make a practice of
buying up the securities of insolvent companies on the brink of reorganization in order that
they may participate in and dominate the reorganization proceedings. The third reason-
and the only one with which we are concerned here-is concentration of assets in order to
exercise permanent control over corporations in which the investment company's sponsors
are already interested, or expect to acquire an interest. INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. IV,
1-2.
In its survey, the SEC found 30 such investment holding-companies and at least an
equal number of investment companies (only closed end management investment com-
panies are concerned with the control of industry) which controlled some industrial com-
panies as an incidental part of their businesses. The SEC concluded: "Control over indus-
trial enterprise is one of the most important aspects of the investment company movement,
particularly from the point of view of the national economy.... Investment companies
have been used to influence or control other corporations in almost every major type of
business enterprise. Their activities have ranged in character from theatre and orchid
farms to the development of new mineral discoveries in Africa, and in size from dance halls
to billion dollar utility and manufacturing concerns. In all it appears . . . that investment
companies have had a close working relationship with industrial, railroad, utility and
financial corporations whose assets exceeded $30,000,000,000." Id. at 1-2.
For a discussion of legal aids to investment company control over industrial enterprises
(lack of charter limitations on investment, waivers, etc.) see id. at 45; and for techniques
of obtaining control, see id. at 16-22.
92. On the whole, investment companies which have invested a substantial part of
their assets in "special situations" have sustained greater losses than truly diversified in-
vestment companies. INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. IV, 22-7. For instance, Eastern States
Corp. an investment company, which had 92.8% of its assets in the stock of one corpora-
tion (24% voting ownership) suffered a paper loss of $14,000,000 on its investment between
1929-1935. Sometimes investment companies with concentrated investments felt impelled
to continue investing when their subsidiaries hit bad times. Goldman Sachs lost 11 million
dollars on its subsidiary, Frozen Foods Inc., part of which went as unsecured loans to the
subsidiary over a two year period of continual deficits. Utility and Industrial Corp. loaned
$250,000 to keep its subsidiary alive, and finally had to write down a $724,264 investment
to $1, and charge off the loans to capital surplus. Id. at 22-7.
93. Id. at 27 et seq.
94. Investment Company Act §§ 5(b)(1) and (2)
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invested in more than 10% of another firm's voting stock. And no more
than 5% of the investing company's assets could be invested in one company.
The investments of "non-diversified" companies, on the other hand, were
left relatively unrestricted. But where a diversified or a non-diversified
company "controlled" an operating company, its "control" became subject
to SEC supervision. Investment companies had to disclose in registration
statements the extent of their existent or intended "control" over operating
companies; and transactions between investment company affiliates and
"controlled" companies were regulated.9
In the act itself, Congress took a step toward defining "control." Section
2 defined it broadly as the "power to exercise a controlling influence." 11
And ownership of 25% of an operating company's voting stock was estab-
lished as a rebuttable presumption of "control." 97 Thus, with its job largely
done, the SEC had merely to define "controlling influence" in cases where
companies attempted to rebut the act's presumption. In so doing, it was
inevitable that the Commission should call upon its experience with the same
words under the Holding Company Act. The broad application of "con-
trolling influence" which had proved so successful in hitting at utility hold-
ing company abuses was carried over to the regulation of comparable in-
vestment company abuses. Where actually applied, it has served with
equal effectiveness.9 8
Before a company could be regulated, however, it had to be brought
within the act's definition of an investment company. Here, the SEC ran
into trouble. Congress defined an investment company as one whose
primary business consisted of investing or trading in securities. Any company
engaging in trading or investing at all and having at least 40% of its assets
invested in securities was presumed to be an investment company. An
applicant for exemption, under Section 3(b), however, could rebut this
presumption by showing that it was "primarily engaged in a business other
95. Investment Company Act §§ 8 and 17; Investment Company form N-SB-1. See
Thomas, Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 918, 924-5 (1941).
Affiliates under the Investment Company Act are defined similarly to the Holding
Company Act. See note 71 supra.
In addition to these provisions, § 12(d) regulates the investments of "controlled" com-
panies. to prevent "controlling" investment companies from violating prohibitions on their
investment policies indirectly through their subsidiaries.
96. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(9).
97. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(9). Investment of less than 25% voting stock
created a contrary presumption that "control" did not exist. Yet the SEC survey had found
that presumptive "control" by investment companies stemmed from ownership of 10-50%
voting stock of a subsidiary. INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. IV, 5. In view of this finding,
the 25% figure seems unduly low for jurisdictional purposes. Compare the 10% voting
stock ownership presumption for holding companies under the Holding Company Act.
This 10% figure squares with SEC studies which revealed that utilities were seldom, if ever,
"controlled" by less than 10% voting stock. Id. at 37 et seg.
98. See, e.g., Chicago Corp., Inv. Co. Rel. 1203 (1948) (owns 30.6 voting stock, rep-
resentatives on board directors, veto power on certain corporate issues).
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than . . . owning, holding, or trading in securities ... through controlled
companies conducting similar types of businesses." " Congress probably
intended to exempt only integrated holding companies, i.e., companies
primarily concerned with directing actual operations through their sub-
sidiaries.' 0 But 3(b), as worded, was also subject to a different interpreta-
tion. Since the section exempted companies which carried on operations
through their "controlled" subsidiaries, and since "control" under the In-
vestment Company Act meant only "controlling influence," the act might
reasonably have been held applicable to companies having less than actual
directive power over their subsidiaries.''
Unfortunately, the SEC did not rule out such an interpretation al-
together. While it took notice of the original incorporating purpose of the
company, the proportion of its income stemming from dividends from
"controlled" companies as compared with direct payments for services,
and the amount of time donated to a subsidiary's businesses,0 2 it resorted
to a search for "controlling influence" where these factors proved incon-
clusive. And in defining "controlling influence," the SEC adopted sub-
stantially the same definition employed under the Utility Act and the
regulatory provisions of the Investment Company Act.'0 3 Thus "controlling
influence" might mean a mere "susceptibility to domination" by the holding
company, stemming from a few interlocking directors or officers or even a
99. Investment Company Act §§ 3(a)(1), 3(a)(3), 3(b)(2). The 40% criterion was
established as a result of SEC study of 1800 corporations. See Testimony of David Schenker,
Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580,
76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 176 (1940).
100. See Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
10065, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 101-2. (1940). The only examples cited in these hearings of
holding companies which the drafters wished to protect were pure holding companies like
General Motors and U.S. Steel which are integrated holding companies running automobile
and steel businesses through their consolidated wholly-owned subsidiaries. The drafters
seemed particularly anxious to keep within the law those holding companies whose assets
were concentrated in large blocs of stocks in operating companies primarily for investment
or other purposes.
101. Thus, a company which spread its investment over several operating subsidiaries
in similar lines of business and maintained a "controlling influence" over these firms might
run a good chance of escaping regulation as an investment company.
102. See, e.g., Business Property Assoc., 12 S.E.C. 845 (1942) (trustees of alleged in-
vestment company actually managed all investment companies of their real estate sub-
sidiaries); M.A. Hanna & Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941) (alleged investment company managed
its subsidiaries and did sales and mining exploration for them). On the other hand, the SEC
refused to exempt alleged investment companies with their assets concentrated in sub-
sidiaries which were presently inactive. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 11 S.E.C. 661 (1942).
103. Throughout its interpretation of "controlling influence" under the Investment
Company Act, the SEC has cited the Holding Company Act cases as precedents. In M.A.
Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941), however, the SEC admitted that "While this phrase as
employed in the Holding Company Act must be construed in the context in which it is used
and in the light of the general regulatory purposes of that Act, which are not necessarily
the same as those of the Investment Company Act, these decisions are nevertheless entitled
to weight as significant analogies." Id. at 589-90 n.13.
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long-established practice of conferring on financial or engineering prob-
lems. 0 4 As a result, applicants for exemption seldom had trouble proving
their "controlling influence" and escaping regulation.0 5
Such mass immunity was hardly what Congress intended. Congress
probably wished to exempt only holding companies actually able to co-
ordinate the policies of their subsidiaries.' True integration, Congress
may have felt, was more important to the country in 1940 than investor
protection. But to achieve integration, a holding company needs more than
"controlling influence." It needs real "control," as that term is defined
under the Securities Act. Public utility experience with "controlling influ-
ence" has revealed that influence sufficient to exploit is not always sufficient
to insure coordinated management.
Under the act as written, however, the SEC has only limited power to
narrow the exemption. It might require proof of a stronger hand in sub-
sidiaries' management to constitute "controlling influence" under 3(b) than
it requires under the same words in the regulatory provisions of the act.
104. Bessmer Securities Company, for example, owned 17% stock in one subsidiary,
elected 2 out of its 7 directors; owned 7% in another and elected 4 of its 11 directors. Despite
the fact that the below-25% investment raised a presumption against "controlling influ-
ence" in both cases, Bessmer was held to have a "controlling influence" because of historical
associations, counseling, etc. Bessmer Securities Co., 13 S.E.C. 281 (1943); M.A. Hanna
Co., 10 S.E.C. 581 (1941) (27% stock, 3 out of 11 directors). "Historical, traditional, or
contractual associations of persons with a company or a dominating persuasiveness of one
or more persons acting in concert or alone may form the basis of a finding of 'control' in the
sense used in the Act." Id. at 589.
105. The SEC itself has declared that the Investment Company Act is the minimum
workable regulation of investment companies. INVESTMENT COMPANrEs, pt. IV, 383 (1942).
Commentators go farther and criticize the Act for its liberal exemption policies. "It appears
that no investment company is finding it difficult to become exempted from the provisions
of the 1940 legislation." Thomas, Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WAsE. L. REv.
918, 925 (1941). See, generally, Notes, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 584 (1940); 50 YALE L.J. 440,
443-4 (1941); 41 CoL. L. REv. 269 (1941).
106. The only reference in Congressional hearings on the 3(b) exemption cite Standard
Oil, Bethlehem Steel and General Motors as examples of the holding companies which
should be exempt, because they are engaged in businesses other than security investment
through their subsidiaries. All of these are integrated holding companies. Congress did
seem anxious to "distinguish between the company which through a majority owned sub-
sidiary or controlled subsidiary is in the business of manufacturing or operating a company,
and a company which invests a substantial portion of its assets in a company merely for invest-
ment or holding for other purposes." Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 10065, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 102 (1940) (emphasis added). The Senate
held extended hearings on a bill for investment company regulation which exempted holding
companies which conducted a business other than investing or security trading only through
wholly-owned or majority owned subsidiaries, making no provision for running such a busi-
ness through controlled companies at all. At the end of that time, investment companies
and the SEC and drafters of the Senate bill got together and drafted a compromise bill
which was approved by committee but upon which no printed hearings were held. This new
bill included the exemption for conducting a business through controlled companies. Hear-
ings before Subcommittee of Senate Banking and Currency Committee on S. 3580, 76th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1-2, 12 (1940).
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This the Commission has not been willing to do. It remains for Congress,
therefore, to implement its intent by insisting upon a finding of real directive
power over operating subsidiaries before an applicant is entitled to ex-
emption.
Tm BONDHOLDER'S SPECIAL CASE: CONTROLLED TRUSTEES
The bondholder had a special "control" problem. His prime concern was
the receipt of his interest when due and his capital upon maturity of the
bond. He, together with all other bondholders similarly situated, had an
indenture trustee, usually a commercial bank, to enforce these rights. In
bad times especially, he depended upon prompt and decisive action by the
trustee against a defaulting issuer.
But trustees were not always loyal to the interests of their bondholders.
Too often, by reason of affiliation with the issuer or the underwriter, they
concealed defaults from bondholders or delayed proceedings to enable
management to salvage its reputation. At times they also permitted man-
agement to dominate an ensuing reorganization to the financial detriment
of the bondholders. 0 7
The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 guaranteed bondholders an independent
trustee. Instead of regulating or requiring the disclosure of "controlled"
trustees, it disqualified outright any trustee who "controlled, was controlled
by, or under common control with" either the issuer or the underwriter of
the bond issue.'0 '
This disqualification wrought havoc in the underwriting industry. Under
the Banking Act of 1933, underwriting departments and security affiliates
of large commercial banks had been forced to part company with their
founders and begin life anew as "independent" corporations.0 9 In most
cases, however, they retained their old officers, personnel, and customers.
For capital, they relied largely on the management or stockholders of the
commercial banks from which they had sprung."0 The Trust Indenture
107. For a full report on the sorry record of unfaithful indenture trustees in the twenties
and thirties see PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES, pt. VI (1936) (trustees under Indentures); 10
SEC ANN. REP. 153 (1945). Such trustees received a much-deserved condemnation from
the judiciary in Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (1936).
108. Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(3). On the numerous other grounds for disqualifica-
tions, and on the Act in general, see Goodbar, Bond Trustees as Statutory Trustees, 28 B.U.L.
REV. 399 (1948); Banks, Indenture Securities and the Barkley Bill, 48 YALE L.J. 533 (1939);
Note, 18 CH. KENT L. REv. 406 (1940). Prior to the act, the SEC could require mere dis-
closure of trustees' conflicting interests in registration statements. See, e.g., Frye Investment
Co., 4 S.E.C. 840 (1939).
109. Banking Act of 1933, § 20, 48 STAT. 162, 188 (1933) as amended by 49 STAT. 684,
707 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 877 (1946).
110. First Boston Corporation descends from a security affiliate of the First National
Bank of Boston; Harris Hall & Co. from the Harris Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago; Blair
& Co. from the Bank of America (pre-1933 split); Central Republic Co. from the Central
Republic Bank & Trust Co. MooDy's, MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, BANKS, INSURANCE, etc.
1287, 1280, 1313 (1950); PEACH, SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS 143-168 (Johns
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science) (1941).
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Act therefore raised the following question: could commercial banks act as
trustees for issues underwritten by their descendant underwriting firms? "I
J. P. Morgan & Co. provided the test case. In 1934, Morgan Stanley &
Co. was incorporated to take over the management, personnel, name, cus-
tomers, and good will of the old J. P. Morgan & Co. underwriting depart-
ment. The officers in J. P. Morgan & Co., as preferred stockholders, con-
tributed over 90% of the new firm's capital. These officers, who owned
about 65% of the equity in J. P. Morgan & Co., then transferred their stock
in Morgan Stanley to members of their families.
After passage of the Trust Indenture Act in 1939, J. P. Morgan & Co.
sought approval from the SEC on its eligibility to act as trustee for bond
issues underwritten by Morgan Stanley. The SEC found "common con-
trol" sufficient to disqualify J. P. Morgan & Co. Although few individuals
shared in the ownership of both firms, and neither firm owned equity in
the other, the Commission found that the officers controlling J. P. Morgan
& Co., the trustee, through 65% equity ownership would be apt to favor
their families" fiiancial interest in Morgan Stanley, the underwriter, in
times of stress. Morgan Stanley, in turn, was sufficiently "controlled" by
the families of these officers through the financial domination inherent in
70% ownership of Morgan Stanley's preferred stock. This "control" was
fortified by business and personal friendships and the sharing of customers
and good will, i.e., the prestige of the Morgan name.
1 12
Other large underwriting houses took the Morgan case to heart. They
ceased doing business on bond issues for which their parent banks acted as
trustee, as long as the same group of families owned most of the capital of
the underwriter and its parent." 3
111. Since both the underwriting and the trust indenture field are dominated by a few
metropolitan firms, the chances that prominent New York and Chicago commercial banks
might serve as trustees on issues underwritten by their former affiliates were high. Eight
New York firms managed the underwriting of 77% of the securities registered during
1934-9. Wncox, op. cit. supra note 35, at 176. Similarly, 95% of the total dollar amount of
all trust indenture work over $1 million is handled by the banks of 9 major cities, and 80.2%
of this work is handled by New York and Chicago banks. See Hearings before Subcommittee
of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2191 and H.R. 5220, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1939).
112. J. P. Morgan & Co., 10 S.E.C. 119 (1941). The SEC had already found in Dayton
Power & Light Co., 8 S.E.C. 950 (1941), aff'd sub nom, Morgan Stanley Co. v. SEC, 126
F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1942), that Morgan Stanley was disqualified under Public Utility Rule
U-12F-2 from receiving underwriting fees from the Dayton utility because of a likelihood
of an absence" of arms-length bargaining between the two firms. This stemmed from J. P.
Morgan domination of the parent of the Dayton utility and his influence over the under-
writing firm.
113. See note 110 supra. First National Bank does no trustee work with issues under-
written by First Boston. Communication to Yale Law Journal from H. S. Parker, First
National Bank of Boston, dated Jan. 6, 1950 in Yale Law Library. Bank of America has
done no trustee work underwritten by Blair & Co. Communication from W. C. Koenig,
Bank of America, San Francisco Branch, dated Jan. 26, 1950 in Yale Law Library.
Some banks, however, still act as trustee for issues underwritten by firms with whose
1951]
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The Morgan case smacked more of "susceptibility to domination" than
power to direct management or policies." As such, it looked more like a
,case of "controlling influence" than "control." But whether there was
actual "control" or only "controlling influence" meant nothing in terms of
bondholder welfare. The Commission's action plugged a gap which might
have permitted trustees to escape disqualification through the simple device
of distributing their holdings in the underwriter to other members of their
families. Investor protection, in this area at least, has triumphed over
semantics.
"CONTROL" IN CONTEXT
This study of "control" in five different statutory contexts has shown
that in no two of them does it necessarily mean the same thing. This is as it
should be. For in each statute the term "control" or "controlling influence"
has a quite different function to perform. By and large, the SEC has been
quick to realize this. Only under the Investment Company Act has it been
doctrinaire in its approach. There, because of its insistence on a uniform
definition of "control" in two different sections of the act, the steady rush
of exemption seekers has gone unchecked. Apart from this, however, the
Commission has wisely interpreted "control" and "controlling influence"
so as to implement the overall scheme of corporate regulation laid down in
each separate statute.
predecessors they had some connection. Chase National Bank may do work on issues under-
written by First Boston although nearly one half of First Boston's stock was originally dis-
tributed to the stockholders of Chase National Bank's former security affiliate, Chase Corp.
MooDy's, op. cit. supra note 110, at 1288. Communication from Paul C. Beardslee, Chase
National Bank of New York, dated Jan. 17, 1950 in Yale Law Library (disclosing continued
work on issues underwritten by First Boston). Harris Trust and Savings Bank also does
work on issues underwritten by Harris, Hall & Co., descended from an underwriting depart-
ment of the bank. In this case, however, the underwriter's stock was distributed to sev-
eral hundred of the bank's stockholders rather than a small family group like the Morgan
partners. Communication from F. D. Mann, Harris Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago,
dated Jan. 10, 1950 in Yale Law Library.
CORRECTION
In Comment, The Impact of the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78, 109
(1951), it is stated: "In 1941 the Justice Department filed an indictment against NBC and
CBS, alleging extensive violations of the Sherman Act. As soon as the Supreme Court up-
held the FCC's authority to issue the Rules, however, the Justice Department withdrew its
indictment because it considered the question as moot." The term "indictment" should
read "complaint." Similarly, in note 152 the term "indictment" should read "complaint."
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